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Stopped in our tracks: 
From ‘giving an account’ to an ethics of recognition in feminist praxis
Abstract
When the Western Australian government announced in 2010 that Indigenous 
people would be compensated for unpaid wages, a Yindjibarndi woman named 
Bigali Hanlon submitted an application to access her government files so that 
she could lodge a claim. At the age of four, Bigali was taken from her home in 
Mulga Downs, Western Australia to live in a church-run hostel for ‘fair-skinned’ 
Indigenous children until she was sent into indentured domestic service as a 
teenager. Three large files document her history. These files, combined with in-
depth interviews, and a film about Bigali and other Indigenous Australian 
people, Walking Tracks Back Home, form the basis of this paper. In reflecting on 
the issues raised by Bigali’s story, we draw on feminist writing on the costs 
associated with being called to give an account of oneself, considering how 
listening might form the basis of an ethics of recognition in feminist praxis.
































































Bigali Hanlon is a Yindjibarndii  woman born in 1940 at Mulga Downs in 
Western Australia.  At the age of four, Bigali was taken from her mother and sent 
to live in a church-run hostel for ‘fair-skinned’ Indigenous children until she was 
13 when she went into indentured domestic service. Wages were collected but 
were never paid to Bigali. When the Western Australian government announced 
in 2010 that Indigenous people would be compensated for unpaid wages, Bigali 
submitted an application to access her government files so that she could lodge a 
claim with the Western Australian Stolen Wages Commission. Three large 
folders document Bigali’s life from her birth at Mulga Downs until she formally 
left care at the age of sixteen. The detail of the records in Bigali’s files testifies to 
how Aboriginal people were subjected to extreme forms of ‘governmentality’ 
(Foucault, 1961), involving a surveillance of their everyday lives and the 
regulation of their movements. 
The starting point for this paper came out of Bigali’s application to the Western 
Australian Stolen Wages Commission, which required documentary evidence to 
support coherent claims from Indigenous Australians for unpaid wagesii. These 
claims coalesced around the need to give a persuasive account on the part of 
Indigenous people, but the effect of this process was that it positioned claimants 
in terms of a one-dimensional ‘victim’ subjectivity. Through her granddaughter, 
Talila Milroy, Bigali has shared her files compiled by the Department of Native 
Affairs. Talila is explicit that Bigali’s story should not be told through a ‘victim’ 
discourse, thereby replicating this positioning, and her experiences of being 
called to account by the Stolen Wages Commission. Instead, Talila’s view, shared 
by Bigali, is that the compulsion to present Bigali’s story through a victim 
narrative should be ‘undone’ in order to highlight the ways in which, through 
this organizational process, this reificatory re-positioning of Bigali accentuates 
rather than recognizes her earlier exploitation.  Drawing on feminist writing on 
‘generous encounters’ (Swan, 2017), as well as Bigali’s own act of generosity in 
sharing her story and documentation with us, we approach this tentatively, but 
with a commitment to showing how Bigali and other Indigenous people with 
similar stories to tell have been ‘undone’ by the Commissions to which they have 
made applications. Drawing on recent writing on a feminist politics of listening, 































































we aim to raise awareness of how the Commissions’ requirements reduce the 
complexity of Indigenous people’s lived experiences to provide coherent victim 
narratives in a way that replicates rather than recognizes the normative 
governmental regimes to which they have been subjectiii. In our discussion of 
Bigali’s story, we explore how the sharing of Indigenous people’s narratives 
might be opened up beyond ‘giving an account’ (Butler, 2005) through a politics 
of listening premised upon an ethics of recognition. 
Bigali’s narrative begins in media res, when many things have ‘already taken 
place to make [her] story possible in language’ (Butler, 2005: 39)iv. While the 
State had documented details of her life, Bigali explained to her grand-daughter, 
Talila, that she didn’t know much of the detail of her early life until she first read 
those files at the age of 70.  When Bigali read a draft of this paper she wanted us 
to stress that she had to ‘fight’ the government to get them to release her files.  
On making application to access her files, Bigali was told that it would be too 
upsetting for her to read the material documenting her life. Her response to this 
was that she did not need to be ‘protected’, the State had already done enough 
‘protecting’ of her, emphasizing that the pain caused is hers to feel.  
Like Bigali’s story, this paper also begins in media res. We do not situate our 
argument within a particular body of literature, or identify a ‘gap’ or relatively 
neglected theme in published research that we claim to be able to address to 
somehow ‘close down’ critique. In some ways, on the contrary, we take our cue 
from what we see as an act of incredible generosity. Bigali has shared her story 
with us, on the understanding that we would continue that generosity by telling 
her story more widely, including with and through academic audiences. She has 
also shared many recollections, feelings and thoughts about aspects of her story 
not ‘captured’ in the official files, and we use this word deliberately, in an 
interview with Talila and in a film, Walking Tracks Back Home, produced by her 
daughter, Michelle Broun, that is part of a wider project recording oral histories 
of Indigenous Western Australiansv.  Bigali’s feedback and reflections on this 
paper have also shaped our narrative. Our desire then isn’t to retell Bigali’s story 
but to unravel the coherence imposed on her narrative by a governmental 































































process, and to emphasize how this process continues to act as an organizing 
one by imposing the conditional coherence of a ‘victim’ narrative on Bigali whilst 
purporting to offer the possibility of recognition and recompense. Bigali’s 
account is part of a much wider story that constitutes a collective struggle for 
recognition. We consider here what form this takes, and what feminists can 
learn from and contribute to this struggle. In doing so, however, we are mindful 
of the need to reflect on the presumption that ‘we’ can somehow translate the 
stranger fetish into ethnographic knowledge (Ahmed, 2000). 
As Swan (2017: 547) outlines, when hearing stories such as Bigali’s ‘the impulse 
towards action is understandable and complicated’. It is understandable because 
doing something is a defense against the shock (including the shock of the 
complicity that is revealed); it is complicated because of the impulse to make 
amends, to somehow reconcile or ‘re-cover’ the past. The desire to act is as 
complex, Swan argues, because of the assumption of various subject positions on 
the part of those who feel a need to ‘do’ something: to make public a sense of 
moral outrage; to express solidarity, or to demonstrate optimism in the 
restorative capacity of the future, rephrased, Swan argues, as a rhetorical call to 
activism: ‘what can be done?’ Swan’s critique of this impetus rests on the idea 
that the desire to act, albeit with the best of intentions, can work to ‘block’ 
hearing, a process that can ‘stop the message getting through’ (Ahmed, 2004, 
cited in Swan, 2017: 247). Putting it starkly, Swan argues that ‘white researchers 
need to listen and learn’, and stop trying to ‘make a difference’. 
For this reason, we do not develop an ‘argument’ as such in this paper, but 
rather try to tell Bigali’s story, as far as possible, in her own words and those of 
her grand-daughter Talila. This raises important issues about the paper’s 
composition and the process involved in re-telling Bigali’s account of her life in 
the context of an academic journal (and academic seminars and conferences as 
well). As authors, we are all women – two of us academics, one of us (Talila) a 
medical doctor. One of us is a white Australian, one white English. Talila (Bigali’s 
grand-daughter) is an Indigenous Australian. While Bigali chose not to become a 
co-author of the papervi, Talila worked closely with her to ensure that Bigali read 































































and commented on emerging ideas, arguments and text. We tried, as far as 
possible, to make the process as inter-subjective and dialogical as possible, with 
all insights revolving around Bigali’s documentation and contribution, as her 
positioning in the process emerged not as the expert in a hierarchical or 
‘authentic’ sense, but as the focal point around which complex layers of 
narrative gradually began to layer. This challenged presumptions about 
authorial reflexivity as we were particularly keen not to turn the focal point back 
onto ourselves, and credibility. Our aim was to raise awareness of Bigali’s story, 
and those of others in similar circumstances, not by corroborating her account 
(and thereby replicating the same governmental processes to which she had 
been subject), but rather to actively listen, and in doing so, to collaboratively 
produce a critique of Bigali’s subjection that she would recognize herself in. This 
principle, of mutual recognition, therefore underpins both the substantive focus 
of the paper, and the process of its production.
In this sense, our aim is not to ‘close down’ critique of the ideas and experiences 
we present, replicating the coherence we seek to ‘undo’; on the contrary, we 
seek to open up a space for listening, thinking and reflecting. This presents a 
number of challenges that we consider in more detail below. Not least of these is 
that, as Ahmed (cited in Swan, 2017) insists, white people’s yearning to make a 
difference often means that we see ourselves as the agents of ‘good’ praxisvii. 
Indeed, as Swan (2017: 549) and others have noted, critical race theorists and 
activists often view so-called ‘white praxis’ with ‘suspicion and cynicism’ (see 
also Sullivan, 2007, cited in Swan, 2017, 549). This carries the risk of further 
‘undoing’ those whose stories we tell, exploiting their relative vulnerability, and 
un-reflexively replicating a white, middle-class, colonial philanthropy 
(Applebaum, 2010; Moreton-Robinson, 2003). In particular, Black feminists and 
activists have cautioned against mobilizing collective pronouns (‘we’, ‘us’ and so 
on) to signify a universal bond of identification organized primarily around 
gender difference. Doing so, as the grammatical and epistemological basis of 
speaking on behalf of Others as a justification for ‘doing good’ with one’s 
privilege, whilst leaving the latter intact, has been the subject of increasing 
critique. Swan (2017: 547) puts it thus when summing up these growing 































































concerns: ‘contra to the postfeminist marketing injunction, white feminists 
should not ‘just do it’’. 
Rather, as Swan goes on to note, a commitment to listening can discourage the 
‘presumptuous and oppressive practices of speaking for’ (Alcoff, 1991: 17, cited 
in Swan, 2017: 553). Listening not only stops the propensity to speak or act for 
in its tracks; it also has the capacity to reflexively undo the compulsion to tell, or 
give an account of oneself, through a seemingly coherent linearity. Listening, as 
the basis of a feminist political praxis, in this sense involves a kind of reflexive 
undoing of that linearity. This process can be risky, painful and profoundly 
discomforting, as Swan (2017) emphasizes. Yet as Moreton-Robinson (2008, 
cited in Swan, 2017) stresses, it is nowhere near as painful as exploitation and 
annihilation has been for Indigenous people. In this sense, Swan, Ahmed and 
others’ call is not to arms but to ears, urging us not to act but rather to stop, and 
listen to the stories that others have to tell, on their own terms and in their own 
ways. For this reason, here and throughout the paper, we have resisted the 
temptation to turn the reflexive gaze on ourselves, seeking instead to retain the 
focus on Bigali’s narrative which is told, as far as possible in her own words, and 
to open up space for a collective reflexivity through which to question who our 
thinking and writing is for, by whom it is produced, and in whose interests.
Following Swan (2017: 549), we ask therefore: What might not rushing to ‘do’ 
something mean? As Swan argues in her discussion of progressive praxis, 
‘listening may be one way in which white academics can contribute to praxis as a 
kind of ‘not doing doing’, or as a collective form of reflexive ‘not undoing’ in 
feminist terms (Butler, 2004). For Swan, drawing on Ahmed, this kind of 
generous encountering – a deliberate not doing, but actively listening, 
constitutes a possible basis for a phenomenological openness that has the 
capacity to ‘stop people in their tracks’, avoiding the kind of self-indulgent 
narcissism that is often badged as reflexivity in white academic research. 
Vachhani (2015: 148) hints at this in her critique of the presumption that to be 
‘defiant, activist and transformative’, academic writing has to be masterful. As 
Moreton-Robinson (2003: 66) has put it, within the latter, white privilege often 































































remains ‘invisible, unmarked and uninterrogated’, while Indigenous women’s 
subjectivities tend to be objectified as the basis of analysis or the focus of 
philanthropic intervention, a point to which we return below.
In Gender, Work and Organization there has been a growing engagement with 
Indigenous women’s histories and contemporary struggles for recognition 
(Blackmore, 2011; Colley, 2013; Eveline and Booth, 2002; Eveline, et al 2009; 
Pio, 2007; Soni-Sinha and Yates, 2013). With the notable exception of Swan 
(2017), the focus of much of this work has been largely empirical, and then only 
in relative passing has there been a situated, sustained interest in the 
particularities of Indigenous Australian women’s lives and work. Eveline et al 
(2009) argue that successful action needs to move beyond categorical 
distinctions between groups, to focus on intersectional experiences of injustice 
and appropriation (see also Colley, 2013), arguing that political representation 
of Indigenous women, especially in Western Australia, is particularly poor. They 
describe the governmental regimes to which Indigenous people have been 
subject in recent years as a ‘textual mediation of indigenous subjugation’ 
(Eveline et al, 2009: 17). But Eveline et al also emphasize the neo-colonial 
problems associated with subjecting Indigenous women’s lived experiences to 
European and North American feminist thinking and ontologies of gender (see 
also Simpson, 2011). Here they pick up on earlier work by Eveline (2005) and 
Curthouys (1994) noting that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
continue to be perceived as ‘rather exotic’ in academic writing, reproducing a 
kind of epistemological geography that needs to be reflexively, collectively 
unraveled. De Ishtar (2004) interrogates this further, arguing that there is an 
urgent need to undertake research not on but with Indigenous people, ‘to engage 
in reflexive involvement’ rather than epistemologically distant scrutiny. To 
embark on this, de Ishtar urges us to work together towards what she describes 
as a ‘relationship in praxis’, developing an approach that can recognize and 
immerse itself in different ways of knowing and being as a step towards 
recognizing and reflexively undoing the silencing of Indigenous women’s voices 
in debates about them. 
































































In presenting and discussing Bigali’s story, weviii attempt this kind of 
immerision, but drawing on different accounts of her life to ask what effect 
giving an account of oneself can have. As Butler (2005: 121, emphasis added) 
reminds us ‘any discourse, any regime of intelligibility, constitutes us at a cost’. 
Pio (2007) has noted how Indigenous people often spend their whole lives 
trying to ‘prove their suitability’ within white governmental regimes. Yet 
Aboriginal Australians have talked of getting ‘tired of telling their stories: she’s 
Stolen Generation and telling that hurts her all the time’ (McKenzie, quoted in 
Maddison, 2011). Requiring Indigenous women to ‘give an account’ has come at 
a cost but in telling their stories, Indigenous people are ‘doing something with 
this telling, acting on [the other] in some way’ (Butler 2005: 51). In our 
discussion below, we examine the nature of the ethical relation that this process 
of giving an account establishes by exploring how we might allow stories such as 
Bigali’s to re-circulate, reflecting on how we might ‘learn without expecting the 
Other to teach’ (Dreher 2009, cited in Swan 2017: 554).  
The discussion below proceeds from Bigali’s story, connecting and weaving her 
thoughts and embodied experiences to insights from feminist literature on 
recognition, difference and belonging, particularly writing by Ahmed (2000, 
2012) and Butler (2004, 2005). We draw on the latter not to ‘make sense’ of 
Bigali’s account but to reflect on how it guides us to in terms of understanding 
the lived consequences of organizational processes of differentiation. We 
consider Bigali’s narrative as a poignant example of how the accounts that we 
give of ourselves to elicit recognition constitute powerful organizational 
processes that categorize difference and order it hierarchically. We also explore 
how feminist research and politics might listen to stories of lived experiences of 
this process, understanding more about its reifying effects and thinking through 
how stories such as Bigali’s might be told differently. In other words, how might 
narratives be re-told to move beyond the subjective constraints of the accounts 
that we are compelled to give in order to be recognized as credible 
organizational subjects – those who might be recognized, respected and 
recompensed? We consider what form recognition might take beyond a politics 































































of accountability, and premised upon an understanding of difference beyond a 
relationship of appropriation.
In developing these thoughts we are mindful that as Jackie Huggins (1998, cited 
in Maddison 2009: xxxviii) has warned:  
The constant demand placed on Aboriginal people to be educators is 
tiring. Surely it is time for non-Aboriginal people to begin their 
journey of discovery by themselves. It is too much to be expecting 
Aboriginal women to be continually explaining their oppression – as if 
somehow it is their fault and they have to talk and write their way out 
of it.  And do others really listen? 
We also reflect on Nicoll’s (2004) observation that it is because of a failure to 
hear, that some people need to keep telling their stories, again and again, and 
are mindful of the hurt this causes.  
For us, Huggins’ (1998) warning and our sense of responsibility in talking, 
thinking and writing Bigali’s story raises a number of ethical dilemmas. On the 
one hand, we have an obligation to tell her story (this was her ‘condition’), and 
on the other, in doing so we risk simply perpetuating the appropriation that 
forms the basis of Bigali’s narrative, replicating past injustices and the tiring 
effects of the constant demands to which Huggins refers. And as Huggins also 
asks: ‘do others really listen’? Where should we tell Bigali’s story, and to whom? 
How? In responding to rhetorical questions such as these, we draw on insights 
from recent feminist writing on ethics and politics as well as Bigali’s own 
reflections to try to move the discussion from a focus on a ‘politics of regret’ 
(Olick, 1999) and recrimination, to one of recognition. Drawing on Butler (2005) 
and Ahmed (2000: 154)ix, we see this process as a political one– calling for a 
politics of listening that moves beyond giving an account towards an ethics of 
recognition.  































































For most non-Indigenous Australians their understanding of Indigenous 
communities and ways of life is largely acquired through media culture (Cutcher 
and Milroy 2010), leading to a reified ‘stranger fetish’ rather than the possibility 
of a recognition-based encounter in the way that Ahmed (2000) describes it x.  
Drawing on Ahmed (2000), we think about recognition as a struggle for 
acknowledgement of difference as the outcome of a shared history (one of 
abuse, exploitation and appropriation), rather than of attributed characteristics. 
This as an important counter to what Ahmed (2000) calls the ‘stranger fetish’ 
that is perpetuated by media culture, which frames our perception of the Other 
prior to our encounter. For Ahmed (2000), it is only by moving from a mediated 
way of knowing the Other to an immersive, proximal way of relating that we can 
open up the possibility of engaging in the kind of mutual recognition necessary 
to overcome a hierarchical organization and appropriation of ascribed 
difference. One of our aims in sharing Bigali’s story, and our thoughts on why it 
is so significant beyond her own narrative, is to open up this possibility of an 
ethical and political openness to the Other in contrast to the coherent accounts 
that Bigali and others who have made applications to the Stolen Wages 
Commissions have hitherto been compelled to give as part of the ‘Stolen 
Generations’. 
Commissioning the self
The ‘Stolen Generations’ is a term that has come to represent one of the most 
oppressive of institutionalized dispossessions enacted by the white colonial 
administration in Australia from 1890s up to and including the 1970s. 
Throughout this extensive period, Aboriginal people were subjected to extreme 
forms of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1961). The constant surveillance and 
regulation to which they were subject was manifested in many ways. The ‘full 
blooded’ Aboriginal was isolated and kept with severe restrictions on 
movements away from the reserves requiring them to apply to obtain ‘passes’ 
that would permit travel off the reserve or across State lines. The ‘half-caste’ was 
seen as particular ‘problem’ that needed to be managed. Government policy 
based on eugenic beliefs of breeding out colour constructed Aboriginality as a 
‘primitive social order’ composed of ‘ritual murders, infanticide, ceremonial wife 































































exchange, polygamy’ (Hasluck 1956: 2) The solution was to remove children 
categorized as ‘half-caste’ from their Aboriginal families and place them in state 
care where they could be taught proper ‘civilized ways’ under the protection of 
Aboriginal Welfare Boards. 
Bigali herself was caught up in the latter process. One example of this, that we 
came across in her documents, is a file note from the Deputy Commissioner of 
Native Affairs, dated 1st May 1942 containing typewritten details as below, as 
well as some additional hand-written notes:
Cards should note this child for removal when four years of age. Egypt 
[Bigali’s mother] is of a dark type of halfcaste and possibly her child 
[Bigali] may be a little too dark for admission to Sister Kate’s. However, 
this is a matter than can be determined by inspection at a later date.
Sister Kate’s was a Children’s Home to which Bigali was admitted on 3rd 
September 1946, at the age of fourxi. Another similar document (a note in one of 
her files written by someone in the office of the Deputy Commissioner of Native 
Affairs, dated 19th December 1941) states: ‘this child is obviously a quarter 
caste’. Bigali herself reflects on the underlying imperative of this chromatic 
categorization of people in the film, Walking Tracks Back Home (Broon, 2017xii) 
when she states that ‘they [the ‘protectors’] take you away from your family, 
your community, your language, your culture – it’s genocide’. 
The Australian Human Rights and Equality Opportunity Commission’s report, 
Bringing Them Home, estimates that in the period 1910 to 1970 between 10 to 
30 per cent of Aboriginal children were removed from their mothers (Langton 
and Barry, 1998). Goodall (1995) highlights how in the early years the policy 
was explicitly directed at removing girls reaching puberty from Aboriginal 
communities. For example, between 1912 and 1928 girls who were 12 and over 
made up 54% of the children taken, while boys who were 12 and over made up 
only 14% (Goodall 1995: 82).  Children as young as three or four were taken by 
force or by coercion from their Aboriginal families on the reserves and adopted 































































out to white families or housed in dormitories (away from their families). While 
a number of studies have highlighted how concerns with ‘racial purity’ formed 
the basis of policies that saw the removal of so many Aboriginal women and 
children (Jacobs, 2005; Holland, 1995) less attention has been paid to the fact 
that these women and children formed a pool of cheap (often unpaid) labour. 
The removal process not only provided a pool of labour but also arguably set up 
a micro-economy in itself, one that reduced the ontological status of the people 
and communities involved to that of things. Another of Bigali’s documents, dated 
28th June 1941, illustrate this, referring to the cartage of goods to Port Hedland 
for ‘three natives and luggage, and one Electrolux [vacuum cleaner]’. 
Presumably, the people, their effects and equipment were being sold and 
distributed as a ‘package’.
Bennett argued as far back as 1930 that the removal of Aboriginal women and 
children from their communities was ‘akin to slavery’ (cited in Holland, 1995).  
Reynolds (1990: 169) describes how this ‘slavery’ benefited Europeans:
The greatest advantage of young Aboriginal servants was that they came 
cheap and were never paid beyond the provision of food and clothing.  As a 
result any European on or near the frontier regardless of their own 
circumstances, could acquire and maintain a personal servant.
This work in the service of white women and families served the dual purpose of 
training the young Aboriginal girls in white ways of housekeeping and 
mothering, as well as providing a cheap pool of reliable domestic labour to 
further white prosperity (Higman, 2002). This further supported the racial 
project of ‘settling’ Australia by positioning white women’s primary role as that 
of reproduction, at the same time bolstering cultural superiority through the 
combined gendered and class connotations of freeing white women from 
domestic labour. Young Aboriginal girls were ‘apprenticed’ as domestic 
labourers with the hope that the training they would receive would not only 
benefit them but that they would become trainers of future nuclear families 
(Goodall 1995: 83). ‘Domestic service’, Higman (2002: 127) suggests, ‘was a vital 































































tool in the civilizing and assimilationist missions, which meshed neatly with the 
desire to recruit useful labor within the archetypal household’.
To this end, not only were Aboriginal children forcibly removed from their 
families and placed into service, their wages were not their own but controlled 
by the State. As Kidd (2007: 8) explains:
Governments around Australia controlled wages, savings and benefits 
belonging to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people for most of the 
twentieth century. Payments withheld included child endowment, 
pensions and even solders’ pay. Much of the money held in trust was 
never paid. 
Indeed, the legislation pertaining to Aboriginal people and the ‘Protection Acts’ 
enforced by the Australian government throughout the period of approximately 
1890 to 1985 saw many Aboriginal people denied their entitlements to wages 
because of the control exercised by state and federal governments. Aboriginal 
people working under contracts of cheap labour had a majority, if not all, of their 
wages sent to the relevant Department in their State who ‘managed’ their 
money. 
Children were largely ‘apprenticed out’ to properties in the country and 
households in the cities where, if they did receive wages, they were paid little. In 
most cases their wages were sent directly to the ‘protector/trustees’ of these 
‘wards of state’ and the young workers never saw any of this money. They were 
often at the mercy of the white employers and easily subject to cruelty, long 
hours, poor food and sexual and physical abuse. Such practices were an integral 
part of the assimilation process, removing girls from a situation where it was 
feared they might ‘breed indiscriminately’ (with full blooded Aboriginals), 
placing them in homes where the risk of impregnation from white men was well 
known (Haskins 2001). This appears to have been common-place. For example, 
in 1915 Archbishop Donaldson visiting Palm Island (Queensland) observed that 































































‘90% of the girls sent out to work as domestics returned pregnant to white men’ 
(cited in Kidd, 1994: 273).  
The sexual exploitation of these vulnerable girls by their white masters served 
the eugenicist argument underpinning colonial governmentality, reinforcing the 
construction of Aboriginal women as promiscuous and ensuring an ongoing pool 
of cheap labour. Choo (2001: 50) reflects on what it was like to grow up in a 
Catholic mission in Western Australia:
The child is taken away from the mother and sometimes never sees her 
again. Thus these children grow up as whites knowing nothing of their 
own environment. At the expiration of the period of two years the mother 
goes into service so that it doesn’t really matter if she has half a dozen 
children.
Research has revealed that often the State management of the wages taken from 
Indigenous workers and children led to fraud, mismanagement and misuse. 
These wages, along with other State and Commonwealth entitlements such as 
maternity benefits, invalid and widow pensions, are collectively known as 
‘stolen wages’. In October 2006, the Federal Government held a Stolen Wages 
Senate Inquiry. This inquiry received 128 submissions and published a report, 
Unfinished Business: Indigenous Stolen Wages. The report recommended that 
State governments allow better access to archives, fund education campaigns 
and provide legal research to support claimants in seeking compensation for 
wages or benefits never paid. Stolen Wages Commissions were held in four 
states: Western Australia, Queensland, Victoria and New South Wales. While 
there were differences in the terms of reference of these State commissions, 
there were important similarities in the way that claimants were required to 
present a coherent account of their life histories, supported by documentary 
evidence. In Butler’s (2005) terms these accounts were given with the aim of 
persuading the Commissions of the intelligibility and credibility of the claims 
made but in doing so, they reified the complexity of applicants’ lived experience 
and life beyond ‘protection’. The accounts given to the Commissions in this 































































sense, ‘flatten’ the complex layers that constitute life stories such as Bigali’sxiii in 
so far as they reduce the fragmentary recollections, often dependent upon 
aesthetic ways of knowing and understanding, to more ‘factual’, linear 
narratives that require applicants to unequivocally position themselves and 
each other as victims. 
Bigali, like thousands of others, was called to give an account as an Indigenous 
child labourer. This required her to cohere her narrative in order to make it 
intelligible in governmental termsxiv, as she was required to give coherence to 
the complexity of her lived experience. This meant assuming the subject position 
of a victim within the dominant terms of the account. A paradox of her life (and 
many others like her) is that Bigali has been called to account by the state, 
controlled and documented, indentured into a slave life, but at the same term 
rendered ‘stateless’. In order to be recognized, the State which had caused the 
trauma and stolen wages in the first place, now required claimants such as Bigali 
to tell their story within the strictures of a pre-determined narrative. Further, 
telling the story was not in itself enough; applicants had to tell a verifiable story, 
supported by documentation which the State had compiled and would hand 
over only so that it could be re-presented in a way that credibility, in the form of 
recognition, to the claimants. In this way, historical injustices associated with 
categorizing and classifying people, separating them off from their families and 
communities, alienating them from their land, ways of life and language, are 
effectively replicated in the governmental processes associated with the 
Commissions that simply position the claimants as ‘victims’ of workplace 
exploitation.  
Despite the State being responsible for managing the wages of Indigenous 
people under the Protection Act, many claims were rejected because of a lack of 
documentation. For example, in Queensland 3,200 applicants (37%) had their 
claims refused due to a lack of government recordsxv. Claimants’ stories were 
not taken at face value, but required empirical substance that could be 
quantified. This, despite the fact that ‘identity’ was part of the process of 
removal of Indigenous people. Indigenous people had their names changed, 































































often several times, at the will of the State. For example, Bigali’s name was 
changed to Sudan by the State when it started documenting her life from age five 
months, and then to Susan when she arrived at Sister Kate’s aged six. She was 
given the name Sudan, just as her mother was renamed Egypt from her 
Yindjibardi name of Eejit (Native Affairs document 332/31). Bigali and her 
brother, Rommel, who was removed at the same time, were deliberately given 
different names in order to separate them:
Sudan is given the surname of Raymond and is quadroon. If Rommel, half 
caste, is also given the same surname there will be a tendency to regard the 
two as being related in the years to come. By placing Sudan at the 
Children’s Cottage we desire her to be raised as white. Had it been decided 
for Rommel to still claim his relationship of half-brother to Sudan, he too, 
would have been sent to Sister Kate’s. In view of the fact that Rommel is to 
be educated at Moore River, it appears to me the relationship between the 
two children is to be forgotten (File Note Acting Deputy Commissioner of 
Native Affairs, 5th September 1946, emphasis added).
The Protectionist practicesxvi documented in Bigali’s government records were 
aimed largely at negating her identity prior to entering Sister Kate’s, and served 
to reify the classification and hierarchical organization to which her and her 
family were subject. Until she reconnected with her relatives later in life, Bigali’s 
story is one of remembering and longing:  ‘I used to climb a big pine tree, and 
that tree would be swaying and I would look out over the hills and I would think, 
“I’m gunna go home one day”’ (Walking Tracks Back Home).  
Protectionist policies were aimed at Indigenous mothers forgetting their 
children and their children forgetting them but it is non-Indigenous people who 
have chosen to forget by engaging in ethical distancingxvii. Ethical distancing 
consigns what happens to the ‘past’, stipulating that Indigenous stories be 
framed solely as victim narratives, which enables non-Indigenous people to 
insist, as Ahmed and others have written, that ‘the past is not our responsibility 
because we weren’t there’. Yet as Ahmed (2005: 72, emphasis added) also notes, 































































the dominant position that ‘this history is not personal’, negates the extent to 
which ‘for the Indigenous testifiers, the stories are deeply personal’.  
‘Undoing’ narrative coherence: Bigali’s story
In contrast to the accounts required by the Commissions, Bigali’s way of 
knowing and conveying her story is highly sensory and embodied, emphasizing 
emotional connection and relationality. We gathered the threads of Bigali’s story 
from three main sources: the interview she did with Talila specifically for this 
project; a short-film called Walking Tracks Back Home and from the folders of 
documents that Bigali generously shared with us. Again, we reiterate that our 
aim is not to ‘re-tell’ or re-frame her story, but to critically, reflexively ‘undo’ the 
imposition of coherence on Bigali’s narrative. The impetus to tell the story has 
come from Bigali herself. Our challenge in this sense is to share the narrative 
without imposing our own coherence on it, in order to convey it faithfully and 
communicate it meaningfully; to this end, Talila has shared emerging insights 
and ideas with Bigali at various stages of the listening, talking, thinking and 
writing process. Emerging from this analytical process and reflective dialogue 
are three themes that we consider below, highlighting the importance of skin, 
smell and language to Bigali’s ways of knowing and sharing her story beyond 
narrative coherence.
Before we explore these themes, the ethical consequences of this working 
relationship and process are important to reflect on. As Butler (2005: 51, 
emphasis added) puts it,
So ‘I’ tell a story to ‘you’, and we might together consider the details of the 
story that I tell.  But if I tell them to you in the context of a transference, I 
am doing something with this telling, acting on you in some way.  And this 
telling is also doing something to me, acting on me, in ways that I may 
well not understand as I go.































































When sharing Bigali’s narrative in a number of different symposia and 
conferences, we have been struck by the way in which her narrative ‘acts on’ the 
audience in the way that Butler describes. We found that telling Bigali’s story 
has opened a space for more Indigenous people to share their own stories.  This 
has happened spontaneously with people choosing to share their family’s story 
of ‘being Stolen’ at the end of our presentations. After one presentation, in a 
quiet space, one Indigenous elder shared his story a couple of weeks after 
hearing Bigali’s. In the quiet of a campus office he recounted how his mother 
was born in the Cootamundra girl’s home. His grandmother had been taken from 
her family and put into domestic service where she was raped. In contrast to 
these kinds of heart-rending and largely previously unshared accounts, non-
Indigenous people have most often found it hard to speak; as a colleague, Jenny 
wrote: ‘Words fail me - but I guess in some ways that’s the point’.  Echoing Swan 
(2017), Jenny hints here that she has been ‘stopped in her tracks’; unable to 
articulate her thoughts or mobilize a desire to act. At various points of working 
together on this project, Bigali’s story has had the same effect on us, and we 
hope that, as we consider the themes below, it will continue to do so on others.
Skin
The ‘protectionist’ processes discussed above were premised upon a chromatic 
categorization of Indigenous people to render them classifiable, and therefore 
containable, according to racialized norms of recognition, as the following 
extract indicates:
I saw Egypt [Bigali’s mother] on 13th November 1941 and her female 
child called Sudan [Bigali] at Mulga Downs Stations. The child is 
approximately five months old and appears to be a quadroon. However, 
sometime should lapse before this is decided with certainly as there is 
some tendency for half-caste natives to get darker coloured skin as they 
grow older. At the present I should say the child is quadroon 
(Handwritten note from Deputy Commissioner of Native Affairs, 19th 
December 1941).   































































In contrast to this reified, chromatic narrative of separation and control, in the 
film Walking Tracks Back Home Bigali and another woman (Sue Gordon), who 
was also taken to Sister Kate’s children’s home (see above), describe the 
importance of touch. They seem to do so in order to convey the importance, both 
at the time and retrospectively, of an embodied connection and collectivity 
otherwise denied them:
It was really, really cold and we had to sleep on the verandah. That was one 
of the worst things, sleeping on the verandah, we used to jump into bed 
with one other but we always got into the trouble (Bigali, Walking Tracks 
Back Home).
Most of the kids wet the bed.  If you wet the bed you would strip off your 
clothes and jump into [another child’s] bed hoping it was dry. So that 
bonds formed with kids. We would walk around arm in arm and it was 
holding onto something (Sue Gordon, Walking Tracks Back Home).  
Ahmed (2000), drawing on Butler (1993) and Biddle (1997), describes the 
significance of this inter-corporeal sociality, this ‘holding onto something’ 
as Sue puts it, as an affectivity that somehow ‘crosses a line’, 
problematizing the difference that classification reifies, and the sense of 
shame it depends upon. As Biddle (1997: 227) has written, ‘shame arises 
from a failure to be recognized’, reifying ‘being an object only for the 
other’s jurisdiction’. In contrast, the affectivity of the skin that Ahmed 
(2000: 45-48) emphasizes ‘opens out bodies to other bodies’ in a way that 
is both ethically and politically important as a challenge to the bodily 
containment and separation that characterized life at Sister Kate’s; again in 
Sue’s terms, it involved a ‘holding on’.
Smell 
Ahmed (2000: 90) talks about dispossession as a process of leaving a space that 
one has been enveloped, inhabited by. Thought about in this way, migratory 
narratives can be understood as spatial reconfigurations of an embodied self, a 































































‘transformation in the very skin through which body is embodied’. Bigali evokes 
this in her own recognition of the significance of smell and its connection to her 
sense of place and belonging:
When I thirteen, I got sent out to a farm. That’s what they did to all the 
kids. Send them out to farms, boys and girls. Cheap labour I got sent out 
to a place called Babakin. Which is quite a long way - It’s up near Bruce 
Rock - and you worked on a farm. I chopped the wood, looked after a 
little baby, I cooked for the shearers, I did the cooking, I did a lot of things. 
That’s where I got abused. I’ve never seen my money. They just bought 
me some clothes but I never ever saw any money. It was very lonely. I got 
along with them fine, but the farmer was abusing me. The old girl that 
was there - she was having another baby. Ah, that was a cold place that 
one. Ah, I hated the cold. But that is when I started to remember where I 
was born because the farmer took me out to where they sheered the 
sheep and tailed the lamb and they had a big fire. They threw all these 
tails in there and the smell - then I remembered I had eaten these things. 
The flames were just coming up, coming up and I could see black faces, I 
could hear noise and I could hear laughing and I went oh, I know where 
I’ve come from. I could smell it, you know (Bigali, interview with Talila). 
Years later, Bigali went to live in Wittenoom (near Mulga Downs Station where 
she was born) to work. Bigali recalls walking along a creek bed pushing her 
daughter, Michelle, in a pram, and finding wild cucumber growing along the 
river:
I opened it, and said “I’ve been here before”, and that smell, I had flash 
backs of the station homestead and we were only 30 or 40 ks out of the 
homestead and I had never been there. Didn’t know I was born there 
until I went back to Sister Kate’s and insisted on knowing and they 
reluctantly told me, “you were born in Wittenoom” (Bigali, Walking 
Tracks Back Home).  
Language































































Bigali described in both the interview and the film how on returning to 
Wittenoom, where she was living, she sought out her family:
I went up to this black fellaxviii and unbeknown to me one was my 
cousin brother and one was my brother, Alec and brother Guinness. They 
were sitting on the ground and I went up to them and I said excuse me, do 
you know my mother? They said yes, I said, do you know who I am? They 
go yes. I said, where’s my mother? She comes into town every Saturday to 
see you. Well why doesn’t she talk to me? We’ve been told, we’re not 
allowed to go anywhere near you by the boss.  I got angry and it was the 
first time I got angry. I never used to swear before and I thought fuck, 
whose got the right to do this, who has the right to take away my baby, I 
would kill anyone who took my baby away, I would kill ‘em.   
Bigali talks very poignantly about being unable, on their first meeting as adult 
women, to speak to her mother in their shared language, reflecting on the 
different emotions this evoked in her mother and herself:
When they came to visit me, Guinness [Bigali’s brother] says this is your 
mum and this is your dad and they shook hands with me like I was a 
stranger. There’s my skinny little mother, shaking hands, speaking 
[Yindjibarndi] language to me. I said I can’t talk language mum. Well she 
screamed and wailed and carried on and then my sister Blanche, she’s 
there, Alec’s father, not my father, and brother, Guinness and somebody 
else, I can’t remember who that was. They all come into the lounge room 
and I felt shame. I was so scared at what the neighbours would say and 
who they were and - mum was so distressed, she went into the kitchen, 
did all my dishes. I said mum you don’t have to do my dishes, come in her 
with us. Poor old girl, poor old girl (crying) (Bigali, interview with Talila). 
Biddle (1997) has argued that the kind of shame to which Bigali refers here is 
the result of a failure to be recognized, and to recognize others in return. Bigali’s 































































sense of being a ‘double stranger’ is suggested when she recounts her inability to 
learn and speak her mother tongue language to Talila:
For some reason I can’t pick it up – I can understand quite a lot of the 
Yindjibarndi language but I can’t speak it. I still feel divorced, from the 
rest of the [community], I don’t feel like I’m really part of the community. 
I’m different and I know I’m different and I had to accept that a long time 
ago. It doesn’t worry me, you know.  Sometimes I used to say to my sister 
I should have stayed stolen then I wouldn’t know you fellas.
Ahmed (2000: 128-9) describes her own experience of being called to give a 
‘double account’ of herself, recalling how when she was fourteen years old two 
policemen stopped her and asked her if she was Aboriginal. She recounts 
replying, ‘no’, rather indignantly in response to this experience of being called to 
account. She explains how one of the policemen winked, and asked her if her 
skin tone was ‘just a suntan’, reflecting on how her denial of being Aboriginal 
and, as she puts it, ‘failure to name or declare [her] race’ implicated her in their 
structure of address, ‘by rendering Aboriginality something to be disavowed’. 
Reflecting on this experience as an adult woman, Ahmed argues that the 
encounter opened up a space in which her subjectivity became ‘unfixed by 
almost but not quite ‘fitting’ the visual prompt that triggers identity thinking’. 
Bigali seems to convey a similar sense of being ‘undone’ by this experience of 
being called to account and, like Ahmed, both regrets and resents the feelings of 
shame this engendered. Although she is now a proud respected elder within her 
own Indigenous community, Bigali continues to feel a sense of distance that is 
hard to convey, but which is poignantly suggested in her sometimes, thinking 
that she ‘should have stayed stolen’.
Towards a politics of recognition
The Stolen Wages Commissions required Indigenous people to give an account 
of themselves.  Drawing on Butler, and listening to Bigali’s reflections discussed 
above, we see two ethical problems arising from this process, both connected to 































































what Butler (2005: 23) calls ‘the social dimension of normativity that governs 
the scene of recognition’. First, the norms that govern the accounts claimants 
were compelled to give had the power to either bequeath or withhold 
recognition according to normative terms set by the State, and not the claimants 
themselves. Second, these normative frames of reference hold the potential to 
confer (or deny) the possibility of becoming a recognizable subject; in the case of 
the latter, the governmental process required assuming and attesting to a 
coherent ‘victim’ narrative. We address these two ethical concerns below and 
tentatively offer ways to move beyond this process of giving an account towards 
an ethics of recognition in feminist praxis.  
In considering the first ethical concern we propose moving from a need for 
coherence to embracing the incomplete, the not quite there, the unfixable. As 
Bigali’s story reminds us, our narratives are conditioned by the norms that 
establish the viability of the subject. Giving an account of oneself is not simply 
‘telling a story’, but rather constitutes the subject as a narrative form in a 
particular way; the particularity of this ‘depends upon the ability to relay a set of 
sequential events with plausible transitions but also draws upon narrative voice 
and authority’ (Butler, 2005: 12). Hence, subjects come into being in the context 
of establishing a plausible, coherent narrative account. However, as Butler has 
argued elsewhere (see Butler, 2004), this coherence comes at the cost of 
complexity, as the account given is constrained and compelled by the norms 
governing subjective coherence, and the desire for recognition of oneself as 
socially viable. Ahmed (2000) develops a similar critique, arguing that coherent 
accounts impose (or in Bigali’s case, replicate) a reified order through their 
interpretation of lived experience; in other words, they are an organization of 
lived complexity. This means that the accounts that we give of ourselves can 
never fully express or ‘carry’ as she puts it (Butler, 2005: 36) the fullness of lived 
experience. Requiring the Other to give a coherent account renders them ‘non-
recognizable’ and then condemns them for this non-recognizability, as in the 
case of those claimants whose applications were rejected by the Commissions 
discussed above. Rather, they constitute a form of thinking that reifies that 
complexity in the service of narrative coherence. The paradox of this, the cruel 































































ontological trick it plays on us, is that producing coherence accentuates our 
‘undoing’ (Butler, 2004) rather than alleviates it. As Butler (2005: 132) puts it, ‘I 
become disposed in the telling’. This is because, as Bigali’s story poignantly, 
painfully illustrates, coherent narratives can never do justice to the impossibility 
of communication that remains as a result of asymmetrical reciprocity. 
In telling her story in a way that brings this dispossession, and its histories, scars 
and traumas to the fore, Bigali does two important – and generous - things. First, 
she reveals how the apparent coherence of the accounts required in 
governmental terms by the Commissions are just that – an imposition of 
coherence on an otherwise complex story. Biglai’s story is not a coherent, linear 
narrative but rather a series of fragmented recollections, some of the most 
powerful of which have been underpinned by Bigali’s aesthetic experiences and 
sensory understanding. Second, in doing so, the unraveling of this apparent 
coherence re-frames difference, in Ahmed’s terms, as an outcome of historical 
positioning, re-siting difference as the outcome of an organizational process 
rather than reifying the illusion that difference is the outcome of ascribed 
characteristics attributable to those who are categorized and classified as 
different. As an important political act, this enables Bigali and so many others 
like her to reclaim her pain, and her right to grieve her own past, a right that has 
hitherto been denied her. As a reminder, in a way that powerfully reverses her 
sense of being called to account, Bigali asks: ‘Whose pain is it? It is my pain, and 
you can’t tell me what kinda pain I am allowed to have. It is not about protection 
anymore’ (Bigali, Walking Tracks Back Home).  
Here Bigali speaks directly to Ahmed’s point (cited in Swan, 2017) that when 
white people ‘feel bad’ on behalf of Black and ethnic minority people, they 
reproduce a fantasy that they know how the Other feels. This appropriation both 
serves to contain the Other’s pain, and to co-opt it; in taking on others’ pain, 
white people can demonstrate their capacity for identification and solidarity 
such that empathic anti-racism becomes a kind of ‘character reference’ 
(Srivastava, 2005: 44, cited in Swan, 2017: 7). Bigali reclaims her pain as her 
own, stopping this appropriation in its tracks. 































































In this sense, and returning to Huggins, Bigali’s story is profoundly 
autobiographical in so far as it ceases to be an account for or to others, told with 
the aim of persuasion; rather, it becomes poetic – fragmented, evocative, 
figurative, ethereal, and generously shared. Unlike the seemingly coherent, 
discrete narratives associated with accounts of difference that Ahmed (2000) 
reflects on in relation to equality and diversity for instance, Bigali’s account is 
difficult to fully or even partially ‘grasp’, and therefore appropriate or co-opt.  
Travis (2010: 233), writing about the ethics and narrative distancing in Toni 
Morrison’s novel, Beloved, makes a related point when she observes, ‘woven 
through the narrative of Beloved is the motif of the fragment, a sign of the 
ineffable and the disruption of epistemological certainty’. Both Morrison and 
Bigali’s stories told on their own terms do not offer narrative coherence and, as a 
result, ‘challenge us to refrain from reaching after ethical closure’ (Travis 2000: 
233). Bigali reminds us of the need to be wary of our engrained disembodied 
academic writing practices that lead us to want to create coherence and clarity, 
to sound authoritative about the Other. Just as we should listen without 
expecting to be taught, we need to craft embodied ways of writing that do not 
seek to order, label or conclude. Rather, our writing as feminists needs to 
involve stitching, weaving of complex, shifting realities (Sommerville, 1991).  
Such writing might free us to write without needing to make a point and without 
concern to make dents or have impact (Cixous, 2004; cited in Pullen and Rhodes, 
2015, 87). Boncori and Smith’s (2019) reflexive narrative on miscarriage, and 
Katlia’s (2019) auto-ethnographic account of becoming a mother are recent 
powerful examples of this kind of immersive, embodied writing that retains 
something of the ‘raw’, dirtiness of the text and refutes the impulse to clean it up 
(Pullen and Rhodes, 2008).   
In relation to our second ethical concern noted above, the ‘audience’ and the 
need to persuade, we ask: How are we to respond to stories such as Bigali’s? 
Butler (2005: 21) posits, ‘an account of oneself is always given to another, 
whether conjured or existing and this other establishes the scene of address as a 
more primary ethical relation than a reflexive effort to give an account of 































































oneself’.  For Butler (2015: 202) telling stories is a political act that can simply 
take the form of ‘listening to, and recording, the details of the story that the 
other might tell’; this ‘can come as the most extraordinary form of recognition’. 
What does Butler mean when she states that listening is a political act, 
embedded within a politics of recognition? Listening can perhaps enable us to 
counter the ‘stranger fetish’ (Ahmed, 2000) that Indigenous feminist and anti-
racist writers have cautioned against, moving from a mediated knowing of the 
Other to an immersive, proximal way of relating that can open up the possibility 
of engaging in the kind of mutual recognition necessary to overcome a 
hierarchical organization of difference that calls the Other to account. It can also 
steer us away from the impulse to act, to ‘do good’, for the reasons discussed 
above. Yet Swan (2017: 8), drawing on Dreher (2009), warns that this kind of 
listening is not easy, it requires the listener to ‘hear how Others experience her 
whiteness and her feminism’ based on the realization that ‘good intentions 
count for very little’. We also need to recognize that ‘whiteness mediates 
listening bodies, ears and spaces’ and that ‘our’ history and social relations will 
affect our ability to listen (Swan 2017: 8). Swan (2017: 8) draws on Ahmed to 
explain that the result of this is that we will already think we recognize who or 
what the Other is before we meet them and as a result will have prejudged them, 
rather than apprehending them in a particular encounter. To encounter the 
Other we need to ‘develop knowledge of what is not fully present’, through what 
Ahmed calls an ‘ethical communication’ that facilitates listening as the basis of 
political action and the redistribution of material resources. This entails 
listening without expecting to comprehend or fully ‘grasp’ the Other, accepting 
incompleteness in the Other’s narrative and being willing to collectively, 
reflexively interrupt our own epistemological project to reflect on the (often 
inadvertent) impulse to act or to contain or ‘stranger’ the Other (Ahmed, 2000; 
Swan, 2017; Travis, 2010). It problematizes the accounts that Others feel 
compelled to give of themselves, framing these as instances of reificatory 
identity-thinking through which one-dimensional linear narratives are required 
to be constructed and evidenced. Through these narratives, as Swan (2017: 8-9) 
has argued, 































































We transform the Other into a pre-determined, prejudiced, universalized 
figure rather than apprehending the particularity of our encounters with 
them.
This kind of recognition-based ethical praxis of listening would require us to 
question ‘the modes by which we are addressed and asked to take up the 
question of who we are’ (Butler, 2005: 30). Recognition in this sense is a 
simultaneously ethical, epistemological and political project. For Butler, it is the 
act of showing and telling, suffering and acting, within a ‘crucible of social 
relations’ that reveals how being called to account impinges upon, conditions 
and limits our intelligibility. Yet when we disclose ourselves, we are able to act 
on their schemes, ‘undoing’ them rather than being undone by them (Butler, 
2004), challenging the norms of intelligibility that govern who is allowed to be a 
speaking being, ‘subjecting them to rupture or revision, consolidating their 
norms, or contesting their hegemony’ (Butler, 2005: 132). Drawing on Ahmed 
and Swan, a recognition-based praxis of generous encounters understood in this 
way is less about speaking or acting, than it is about listening and being ‘stopped 
in our tracks’ by what cannot be articulated through coherent, narrative 
linearity or documentary evidence. For researchers, it involves adopting a 
posture of vulnerability that requires us to be receptive to the limits of knowing 
and a willingness to stay with not knowing what to do or say (Page, 2017).  As 
Swan (2017: 12, emphasis added) puts it, staying with not knowing involves 
listening 
In ways that are elusive and not easily reduced to prescription … 
encouraging us to challenge our ignorance-making practices of Othering by 
listening to the unknowable and ungraspable. This means not fixing, 
pinning down or knowing the Other.
What it might mean, however, is raising critical awareness of how organizational 
processes and practices do so, accentuating Others’ pain whilst purporting to do 
precisely the opposite. In thinking about this, we have considered here how the 
sharing of Indigenous people’s narratives might be opened up through 































































recognition-based politics of listening. In this vein, we do not offer a conclusion 
or seek to make an ‘argument’ as such, but rather ‘another tentative beginning’ 
(Pullen, 2006: 295) as this is articulated in Bigali’s own words in the film, 
Walking Tracks Back Home. Here, Bigali reflects on how she has reconciled the 
past and states with passion in her voice how she was determined to:
Make sure my children knew who their family were, where they’d 
come from. I was gunna let them grow up and be proud of who 
they are. Be Aboriginal: be proud.  
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i Yindjibarndi people is the name of a distinct society of people who traditionally lived 
in the area near the town of Roebourne in the Pilbara region of Western Australia.  The 
country of the Yindjibarndi people has been occupied for more than 40,000 years.  The 
area is bordered by Kariyarra and Nyamal land to the north, Ngarluma to the west, 
Martuthunira and Kurrama land to the south and Nyiyaparli and Palyku land to the east. 
It is around the area of the Fortescue River. (http://www.wangkamaya.org.au/pilbara-
languages/yindjibarndi-overview, accessed 2 March, 2019).  Over 300 Indigenous 
Australian language groups and dialects covered the continent at the time of European 
settlement in 1788 (around 66 in Western Australia). Today only around 120 of those 
languages are still spoken and many are at risk of being lost as Elders pass away. 
Yindjibarndi is the strongest survivor of the many languages which came together in 































































Roebourne, and is also spoken in Onslow and other Pilbara 
towns.(https://www.waitoc.com/culture-experiences/aboriginal-culture/aboriginal-
languages, accessed on 2 March 2019).
ii We consciously begin with Bigali’s story rather than a more conventional 
‘positioning’ or siting of her narrative in academic concepts and concerns. 
Reviewers encouraged us to share the story and Bigali’s contribution to the 
paper in this way in order to enact its ethics and politics.
iii Important parallels can be noted here with feminist critiques of the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission – see Malkki (1997), Ross (2003) and Godobo-
Madikizela et al (2005). As Ross (2003) emphasizes ‘having voice’ is not the same as 
‘being heard’. See also Coulthard’s critique of the ‘discourse of healing’ in Canada in the 
1990s which, he argues, positioned indigenous people as needing to account for the 
harm done to them rather than interrogating a system of acculturative violence 
(Coulthard, 2014).
iv Here and throughout the paper, we are very conscious of the challenges posed 
by bringing white western theory to bear on indigenous life stories; even the 
term to ‘bear’ suggests adding weight – an unreflexive epistemological pitfall we 
risk falling into – and connotes a ‘weighing down’, further containing rather than 
opening up. We hope that our focus on is engaging and sharing rather than 
further subjecting/subjectfying, but inevitably the process of producing an 
academic paper carries this risk. We cannot simply ‘resolve’ this tension, and 
trying to do so would be counter to the aims of the paper and wider project; 
rather our hope is to highlight what listening to narratives such as Bigali’s might 
enact politically and ethically by refraining ‘us’ (authors, readers) from engaging 
in unreflexive action.
v The film Walking Tracks Back Home is part of a bigger project,  Indigenous Community 
Stories,  that has recorded 100 Indigenous Elders from across Western Australia telling 
the stories of their accomplishments and reflecting on their lives and culture. The 
project aims to record these oral histories for the nation to share. 
https://www.screenwest.com.au/news-events/2017/08/100th-indigenous-
community-story-filmed-south-west/ accessed 2 March, 2019.  This paper is one 
among several iterations (undoings) of a rich and complex narrative explored through 
varying media and involving multiple voices and reflections.
vi We invited Bigali numerous times to co-author the paper with us, but she declined, 
preferring instead to work with us collaboratively through Talila. Throughout the 
process, we were conscious that the social fields in which Indigenous women especially 
as situated are complex, and shaped by multi-layered historical processes and power 
relations.
vii Throughout the paper we use the term ‘praxis’ politically and epistemologically; that 
is, to refer to a dialectical relationship between theory and practice, thoughts and 
action, and as a way of knowing that transforms what is known through acting upon it. 































































viii Here and throughout the paper, we follow Swan’s (2017) use of collective pronouns 
(‘we’, ‘our’ etc.) to refer to ourselves as the authors of this paper, and as the tellers of 
this story, in this particular form. We use these terms to speak to women not in order to 
re-centre whiteness but to ‘call it to account’ in Butler’s (2005) terms. 
ix In this aspect of their work, feminist writers such as Butler and Ahmed draw from 
phenomenological thinkers such as Merleau Ponty and Levinas in emphasizing the 
importance of touch as more than a physical form of interaction, but rather as an inter-
corporeal, inter-subjective one.
x More than three decades ago, the then Prime Minister of Australia, Paul Keating, 
acknowledged the failure of non-Indigenous Australians to engage in this form of 
recognition in the much lauded Redfern Speech (1992): ‘It begins, I think, with that act 
of recognition. Recognition that it was we who did the dispossessing. We took the 
traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life. We brought the diseases. The 
alcohol. We committed the murders. We took the children from their mothers. We 
practiced discrimination and exclusion. It was our ignorance and our prejudice. And our 
failure to imagine these things could be done to us. With some noble exceptions, we 
failed to make the most basic human response and enter into their hearts and minds’.  
xi Sister Kate’s was named after Katherine Mary Clutterbuck (1860-1946), an Anglican 
nun, who ran orphanages for Aboriginal children in Western Australia. The Home was 
funded by the Aborigines Department to house ‘fair skinned’ Aboriginal children.
xiii A fascinating account of this complexity can be found in Tauri Simone’s (2016) 
thesis, Aboriginal Stockwomen: Their legacy in the Australian Pastoral Industry, which 
documents not only the paucity of accounts of Indigenous women’s contribution to 
Australian industry, but also the importance of developing culturally and 
methodologically appropriate ways of addressing that gap. Of particular note is that, 
whilst undertaking her research, Simone found that (because women were not allowed 
to be employed as stockworkers), their employment was often not recorded in 
government documents; they were literally written out. It was only through reading 
older drovers’ diaries and notes that she was able to trace stockwomen’s histories. In 
the process, she came across a number of cases of women, including a renowned 
horsewoman called Maudie Moore, who ran the Durham River Station in the Kimberely, 
who worked as Head Stockwomen. These women would have had responsibility for 
organizing the station and managing a large team of workers and animals, yet their 
stories have been excluded from dominant accounts, the complexity of their lives and 
their achievements erased. As Simone has put it, ‘Aboriginal women are under-
recognized and under-acknowledged for the participation that they’ve had … these 
were hard, strong women’ (Morris, 2018).
xiv Bigali was fortunate in that her case was well documented, and unlike many others’ 
experiences, her documentation remained largely un-redacted.
xv In Queensland in 2007 $19.5 million was paid to 5,553 ‘eligible’ claimants. 4,211 
people received $4,000 and 1,342 received $2,000. 































































xvi The Aborigines Protection Act 1886 (Act no. 1886 (50 Vict. No.25)) was passed on 2nd  
September 1886 and came into effect on 1st January 1887. This Act established the 
Aborigines Protection Board and enabled the appointment of Protectors of Aborigines. 
It gave wide powers to the Board and Protectors to involve themselves in the lives of all 
Aboriginal people in Western Australia, including the care, custody and education of 
Aboriginal children. The Act also empowered Magistrates to apprentice Aboriginal 
children to work until the age of 21 years. Parts of this Act were repealed in stages, from 
1889.
xvii Blackmore (2011) describes the routine positioning of Indigenous mothers as ‘unfit’ 
within the normative regimes of racist governmentality that supported these practices.
xviii The Aboriginal English words ‘blackfella’ and ‘whitefella’ are used by Indigenous 
Australian people when referring to Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians 
(Appropriate terminology Indigenous Australians, www.flinders.edu.au/CDIP, accessed 
2 March, 2019.
Page 37 of 37 Gender, Work & Organization
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
